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ABSTRACT
This Article explores a problem faced by many wedded same-sex couples: the 
difficulty in obtaining a divorce. Suppose two men from Pennsylvania travel to 
Massachusetts to obtain a marriage license and return to Pennsylvania shortly 
thereafter. If their marriage breaks down, the couple will be unable to divorce in the state 
because Pennsylvania refuses to recognize the marriage for any purpose. Moreover, due 
to Massachusetts’ residency requirement, the couple cannot simply travel back to 
Massachusetts to divorce. Because this problem is in part encouraged by state mini-
DOMAs, and the Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule on DOMA’s 
constitutionality, this Article will also explore the various rationales for holding DOMA 
unconstitutional, how each affects mini-DOMAs, and thus same-sex divorce. If mini-
DOMAs are permitted to stand, this Article urges that all States be required to recognize 
same-sex marriage at least for the limited purpose of granting divorce so that married 
same-sex couples will no longer find themselves “wedlocked.” 
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INTRODUCTION
It is unclear whether Jessica Port and Virginia Anne Cowan should be referred to 
as a lucky couple. They lived in Maryland, which did not recognize same-sex marriage. 
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Nevertheless, in October 2008, they married out-of-state.1 Unfortunately, their undying 
love for each other did not last. The women separated in June of 2009, and,in July of
2010, they filed for divorce in Maryland.2 However, this did not end their story. 
Following a seven-minute hearing,3 Judge A. Michael Chapdelaine denied the couple’s 
request for an uncontested divorce. He cited the fact that the state of Maryland did not 
recognize the women’s marriage even though he acknowledged the parties demonstrated 
an “express purpose of ending their marriage and there [was] no hope or expectation of 
reconciliation.”4 Judge Chapdelaine further remarked that to recognize the marriage, even 
solely for the purpose of granting the divorce, would be contrary to public policy.5 What 
made this case odd was that Maryland had previously recognized other marriages that
were not allowed in Maryland for purposes of divorce.6 Moreover, at the time Judge 
Chapdelaine denied the couple’s divorce, other courts in Maryland were willing to grant 
same-sex divorces.7
This Maryland district court, however, left Port wondering if she would ever get 
divorced.8 She feared that she would be tied to Cowan forever, and without a divorce, 
Port worried she would not be able to move forward.9 Port was also concerned about the 
consequences of purchasing assets and eventually having children: would Cowan have 
any property interest in the house Port recently purchased if the couple was technically 
still married? If Port had a child, would Cowan be presumed to have joint-custody?10
Fortunately, by 2012, Port’s fears were subdued when the highest court in Maryland 
finally granted the couple a divorce, finding it unconstitutional to leave same-sex married 
couples without a remedy to dissolve a marriage.11
Future same-sex couples facing divorce in Maryland will not face the same 
trauma that Port and Cowan had to endure because the state legislature recently passed a 
bill that legalizes same-sex marriage.12 Still, the majority of states do not recognize same-
sex marriage, and the inability of married same-sex couples to divorce is bound to be a 
                                                          
*Harvard Law School, J.D. Candidate 2013; Duke University, B.A. 2010. Special thanks to Professor 
Michael Klarman for insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
1 Port v. Cowan, Case No. CAD10-22420 at *1 (Cir. Ct. Md. Oct. 22, 2010). Thanks to the National Center 
for Lesbian Rights for providing a copy of the case.
2Id. 
3Md. High Court to Hear Same-Sex Divorce Case,CBS NEWS(April 6, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57410423/md-high-court-to-hear-same-sex-divorce-case/. 
4Port, Case No.CAD10-22420 at *1.
5Id. at *1–2. 
6Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 A. 358, 359 (1916) (recognizing a union between an uncle and a 
niece for purpose of divorce only).
7See, e.g.,Cole v. Clover,No. 18-C-10-000327 (Cir. Ct. St. Mary’s Cnty., Md. 2010).
8 Andrea F. Siegel, Same-Sex Divorce Case Heads to Top Maryland Court, THE BALTIMORE SUN, March 
17, 2012 available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-03-17/news/bs-md-ar-same-sex-divorce-
20120317_1_gay-divorce-divorce-hearing-uncontested-divorce/2.
9See Elizabeth Landau, Denied Divorce, Some Same-Sex Couples ‘Wed-locked’, CNN (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/07/living/same-sex-divorce/index.html.
10Seeid.
11Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 982 (2012) (“Under the principles of the doctrine of comity . . . Maryland 
courts will withhold recognition of a valid foreign marriage only if that marriage is “repugnant” to State 
public policy. . . . A valid out-of-state same-sex marriage should be treated by Maryland courts as worthy 
of divorce . . . ”).
12Civil Marriage Protection Act, 2012 Maryland Laws Ch. 2 (H.B. 438) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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problem until same-sex marriage is nationally recognized (and not just for purposes of 
receiving federal benefits) or until courts realize their ability (or requirement, if Congress 
steps in) to grant same-sex divorces. Under the current framework, as more same-sex 
couples get married, more same-sex couples will desire divorces and yetbe forced to 
remain in their failed marriages.13 Courts in Nebraska, Indiana, Texas, and 
Pennsylvania—states that do not recognize same-sex marriage—have each denied same-
sex divorces.14 The problem arises because, for the most part, states that do not recognize 
same-sex marriage are refusing to grant couples thathave been married elsewhere 
divorces.15 To make matters worse, many couples are also being denied access to courts 
for the purpose of being divorced in the state where the original marriage was performed 
due to standard residency requirements. For example, a same-sex couple from 
Philadelphia married in Massachusetts would likely be denied a divorce if they returned 
to Pennsylvania, which does not recognize same-sex marriage.16 Additionally, on account 
of Massachusetts’ residency requirement for divorce—that at least one spouse live in 
Massachusetts for a year prior to filing for divorce—the couple would be left without a 
venue to perform a divorce.17 To complicate mattersfurther, Massachusetts’ statute not 
only requires one year of residency, but the state also will not grant a divorce to a couple 
that “removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.”18
In many respects, same-sex marriage has given the words “’til death do us part” a 
whole new meaning. While no one enters a marriage wishing that it will end prematurely, 
nearly 50% of all marriages end in divorce.19There is no reason to believe the divorce rate 
for same-sex couples will be drastically different from that of heterosexual couples. 
Although divorce can have negative effects on the individuals involved as well as 
children,20 the ramifications for same-sex couples who are unable to divorce are
catastrophic. But neither Congress nor the circuit courts have adequately addressed this 
problem. Congress needs to amend the law to explicitly require courts to hear same-sex 
divorce cases. Alternatively, courts should adjust their understanding of the law to open 
                                                          
13See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR-014654 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2009) (denying 
divorce to same-sex couple); Mueller v. Pry, No. CI10-237 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Jan. 25, 2011) (same); Kern v. 
Taney, No. 09-10738 (Pa. Berks County Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2010) (same); In re Marriage of J.B. & 
H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010) (same). 
14Id. 
15 A few courts in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage continue to open their courtrooms for the 
purpose of performing same-sex divorces. See, e.g.,Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo. 
2011); Port, 44 A.3d at 982.
16750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (2012).
17See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 208 § 5 (2012).
18Id. 
19See, e.g., Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What it Shows and How it 
Might be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 5 (2002).
20See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 653 (2d Ed. 2007) (referring to the uneven socio-
economic consequences of divorce); L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION xii (1985) (noting that 
divorced women and children experience a 73% decline in standard of living post-divorce); JUDITH 
S.WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS &SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE xiv 
(2000) (arguing that children often have negative effects from taking on new responsibilities after their 
parents are divorced); Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children,62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269, 1269 (2000); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: 
A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1169 (1999) (describing the hardships women and 
children experience after divorce).
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their doors to grant same-sex divorces.Regardless of whether astate acknowledges same-
sex marriages for other purposes, its courts should grant these divorces so that same-sex 
couples will no longer be “wedlocked”21 in failed marriages. 
This Article argues that same-sex couples have the same right to divorce as 
heterosexual couples. Denying same-sex divorces creates a serious burden on same-sex 
couples, violates their right to divorce, and amounts to a denial of these couples’ due 
process rights.  Because the issue of same-sex divorce is intimately related to recognition 
of same-sex marriage, this Article will first explore in depth the Defense of Marriage Act, 
the federal law that (a) defines marriage as exclusively between one man and one woman, 
and (b) permits states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state.22
Assuming the Supreme Court finds jurisdiction to rule on Windsor this term,23 it will 
determine whether Congress may define marriage for federal purposes as between one 
man and one woman. How the Court decides will also determine whether states may 
continue to deny recognition of same-sex marriages performed out-of-state. Since one of 
the biggest obstacles to divorce for same-sex couples is state courts’ refusal to recognize 
same-sex marriage, the Court’s ruling in Windsor will directly affect the ability of same-
sex couples to divorce.
This Article explores the various legal arguments for holding the Defense of 
Marriage Act unconstitutional, considers their implications forsame-sex divorce, and 
explains why thoseimplications matter. Part I examines the history of the Defense of 
Marriage Act and the various rationales for holding the legislation unconstitutional. 
While it is likely the Supreme Court will strike down the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act, there is a distinct possibility the Court will craft a narrow decision. In such a 
decision, the Court may find that not all states are required to perform same-sex 
marriages but may permit states to maintain or enact their own state legislation that 
resembles the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Part II explains why under such a regime, 
same-sex divorce is a serious problem the Court should consider when reaching its 
decision this spring. Part III proposes a possible solution for same-sex couples seeking 
divorces, arguing that even if states may continue to forbid performing same-sex 
marriage, they should be required to recognize same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce 
proceedings. These states should make their courts available for same-sex couples who 
were married out-of-state and wish to divorce. If states are not required to do so, same-
sex couples may be bound in unworkable marriages indefinitely and may thereby be 
denied their fundamental right to divorce. 
                                                          
21 Both scholars and the media have used the term. See Mary Patricia Byrn& Morgan L. Holcomb, 
Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2012); Landau, supra note 9.
221 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
23United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (granting certiorari to hear the decision).
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I. SAME-SEX COUPLES HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY AND DIVORCE:
ERADICATING DOMA
Although the Supreme Court has yet to acknowledge the same-sex right to 
marriage,24 more than a decade ago, scholars argued that America was “on the verge of 
legalizing same-sex ‘marriage’ by way of a court-ordered redefinition of marriage . . . 
.”25Nevertheless, we are not quite there yet, as less than one-quarter of states have 
legalized same-sex marriage, and the Court is not required to decide whether there is a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage.At the end of this term, however, the Supreme 
Court will rule on the validity of the Defense of Marriage Act, the federal law commonly 
known as DOMA, which defines marriage as between a man and a woman.26 The Court 
will also rule on the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a California constitutional 
amendment adopted via a 2008 ballot initiative that extinguished same-sex couples’ right 
to marry—a right established by the Supreme Court of California earlier that year.27
Although I remain uncertain how the Court will rule on Proposition 8—it seems 
unlikely that the Court will recognize same-sex marriage as a fundamental right but 
instead reach a narrow decision28—this Article will focus on the Defense of Marriage 
Act. It seems likely the Court will strike down the Defense of Marriage Act this term.29
During his confirmation hearings, Attorney General Eric Holder declared, “The duty of 
the Justice Department is to defend statutes that have been passed by Congress, unless 
                                                          
24 Some argue this is in part due to America’s moral repulsion against same-sex marriage; others argue it is 
in part due to that opening the door for condoning polygamy. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge & William 
C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage: A Presidential Priority, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL’Y 623, 640 (2001); 
George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. &POL’Y 581, 628–31 (1999).
25 Organ & Duncan, supra note 24, at 627. 
261 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2006) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) which declares that:
Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof No State, territory, or 
possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any 
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or 
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, ortribe, or a right 
or claim arising from such relationship.
27See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). See also In Re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
28 Some scholars believe the Court should rule narrowly so as not to forbid mini-DOMAs. See William 
Eskridge& Hans Johnson, Commentary on Marriage Grants: Marriage Equality’s Cinderella Moment, 
SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2012, 2:10AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/commentary-on-marriage-
grants-marriage-equalitys-cinderella-moment/ (“[t]here is good precedent for this narrow approach.”). See 
also Kenji Yoshino, Commentary on Marriage Grants: Different Ways of Splitting the Difference—The 
Menu of Options in Hollingsworth v. Perry, SCOTUS BLOG, (Dec. 8, 2012, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/commentary-on-marriage-grants-different-ways-of-splitting-the-
difference-the-menu-of-options-in-hollingsworth-v-perry/ (There are at least five ways in which the Court 
may rule). 
29See, e.g.,Michael J. Klarman, “Gay Rights May Get Its Brown v. Board of Education,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
11, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/gay-rights-may-get-its-brown-v-board-
of-education.html. (“Conservative justices who value federalism and liberal justices who sympathize with 
gay marriage will probably combine to invalidate the act.”); Yoshino, supra note 28 (“[T]he Court will 
strike down DOMA. . . . Justices on the right tend to favor state power (relative to federal power); Justices 
on the left tend to favor gay rights.”).
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there is some very compelling reason not to.”30 On February 23, 2011, the Attorney 
General informed Congress that after careful consideration, including a recommendation 
from the President, the Justice Department would no longer defend Section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, the portion of the act limiting marriage to “a legal union 
between one man and one woman.”31 Attorney General Holder continued that together he 
and the President concluded Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.32 Most recently, the President publically 
reaffirmed his commitment to the cause when he declared that “[o]ur journey is not 
complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone else under the law, for 
if we are truly created equal, then surely the love we commit to one another must be 
equal, as well.”33 Still, Attorney General Holder explained that the President has 
instructed the Executive Branch to continue to comply with DOMA “unless and until 
Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the 
law’s constitutionality.”34 Even if the Court chooses this path, it will be interesting to see 
which of the several rationales available the Court chooses to strike down the law. There 
are legitimate arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. If the Court finds DOMA unconstitutional, whichever rationale it chooses will 
have a significant effect on the ability of individual states to continue to ban both the 
performance and recognition of same-sex marriage and therefore, on the ability of 
individual states to forbid same-sex divorce.
A. History of DOMA
Congress adopted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 as a direct response to a 
lawsuit brought by three same-sex couples in Hawaii challenging the Hawaii Department 
of Health’s denial of marriage licenses on the ground that same-sex couples could not 
marry.35 At the time, no major national gay rights organization supported the lawsuit for 
fear it would lose and thereby hurt the cause.36 Gay rights organizations also feared a 
lawsuit would create backlash from gay rights opponents who may have feared 
thatgeneral anti-discrimination laws would lead to same-sex marriage37—a fact 
                                                          
30Nomination of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Nominee to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 112 (2009).
31Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 
23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter Letter]; 1 U.S.C.A. § 
7 (2006). Although Eric Holder has publically declared Section 3 to be unconstitutional, Paul Clement will 
be arguing on behalf of its constitutionality this spring. See generally Brief for Respondent The Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives on the Merits, United States v. Windsor
(2013), (No. 05-1631), 2013 WL 267026. 
32Letter, supra note 31.
33 Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013). 
34Id. 
35H.R. REP. NO.104-664, 2 (1996) (“[DOMA] is a response to a very particular development in the State of 
Hawaii.”). See alsoBaehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
36MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR 48 (2012) (“In 1989 . . . executive director of 
Lambda Legal, stated, ‘As far as I can tell, no gay organization of any size, local or national, has yet 
declared the right to marry as one of its goals.’”).
37Id. at 55, 216.See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding 
that forbidding same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the state constitution).
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which,although later proved true, leaders did not wish to concede. Even though the 
Hawaii case was not the first attempt to legalize same-sex marriage,38 it may have been 
the first time the notion that a state would permit same-sex marriage became real. While 
the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Hawaii Department of Health, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court reversed, holding that the three plaintiffs were entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing regarding their Equal Protection claim.39 Additionally, the court held 
thestate had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their sex, and therefore,
their Equal Protection claim would be subject to heightened scrutiny.40The case was 
remanded to determine whether Hawaii had a compelling reason to exclude same-sex 
couples from marriage.41Before the trial court had the opportunity to rule on the case, the 
Hawaiian legislature tried to makeit explicit that same-sex couples could not marry.42
As a result, Congress was concerned that “[t]he prospect of permitting 
homosexual couples to ‘marry’ in Hawaii threaten[ed] to have very real consequences. . 
.”43 Congress particularly worried that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states that
believed same-sex marriage to be repugnant would have been forced to recognize and 
give binding legal effect to same-sex unions performed in other states.44 Moreover, 
Congress wanted to stop what it viewed to be an “orchestrated legal assault” against 
traditional heterosexual marriage.45
Accordingly, Congress passed DOMA with two goals in mind. The first was “to 
defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.”46 The second was “to protect 
the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition 
of same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implications that might attend 
the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage 
licenses.”47 Although the main purpose of DOMA appears to be protecting the institution 
of heterosexual marriage, Congress also acknowledged the legislation would advance two 
additional governmental interests: “protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-
governance”—a Tenth Amendment consideration—and “preserving scarce government 
resources.”48
Despite the controversy that surrounds DOMAtoday,49 the bill made its way 
through Congress quickly and with overwhelming support. In July, the House passed 
                                                          
38See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 54 (Free Press 1996) 
(discussing the National Coalition of Gay Organization’s 1972 attempt to repeal all legislative provisions 
restricting marriage to one man and one woman). 
39Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
40Id. at 65–67.
41Id. 
42 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217. Although the trial court ultimately ruled that Hawaii had no compelling 
justification for excluding same-sex couples from marriage, Baehr v. Miike, NO. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), the Hawaii Supreme Court eventually vacated the trial court’s decision and 
directed the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit in light of the State’s new mini-DOMA. Baehr v. Miike, 994 
P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
43H.R. REP. NO.104-664, 2 (1996).
44Id.See alsoU.S. Const. Art. IV, §1.




49See, e.g.,KLARMAN,supra note 36, at 119, 161.
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DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67,50 and by September, the Senate passed the bill by 85 to 
14.51DOMA sped through Congress in part due to many Congressmen’s deep-rooted 
homophobic views.52On September 21, 1996, late at night and without a public 
ceremony, President Clinton signed DOMA into law.53
Following the passage of DOMA, the United States remains divided on the issue 
of same-sex marriage. While some states later moved in the direction of legalizing same-
sex marriage, even before DOMA was passed, many states were already taking anti-
same-sex marriage measures. However, in 2003, Massachusetts became the first of now 
twelvestates and the District of Columbia to legalize same-sex marriage.54 In these twelve 
states and the District of Columbia, DOMA still applies.Therefore, it still prevents
married same-sex couples from using their marital status to benefit from the more than 
1100 federal rights statutes and programs, including tax and employment benefits,55
whose administration in part turns on one’s marital status.56 At the other end of the 
spectrum, several states have taken affirmative steps to forbid same-sex marriage within 
their borders. The non-recognition of out-of-state marriages is not a new phenomenon; 
rather, states have always had the ability to refuse to recognize out-of-state marriages that 
clearly violate those states’ public policies.57 Whether states may constitutionally ban 
same-sex marriage under this exception remains unanswered. Still, a majority of states 
have adopted their own mini-DOMAs, both banning the performance of same-sex 
marriage and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state.58 Some of 
these mini-DOMAs include express language that state recognition of same-sex marriage 
would violate public policy.59 In total, thirty-sevenstates have either constitutional 
amendments or statutory provisions that define marriage as a civil unionbetween a man 
                                                          
50142 CONG. REC. 17094-95 (1996).
51Id.
52Brief on the Merits for Respondent at 9, United States v. Windsor, (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 
701228.
53KLARMAN,supra note 36, at 63.
54See generally Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (holding that forbidding same-sex couples from civil 
marriage violated the state constitution). 
55See, e.g.,Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass. 2010) 
aff'd, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
56See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR 
REPORT 1 (2004) (identifying 1138 federal laws upon which one’s martial status is a factor). 
57ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE 
LINES 117 (2006). See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate,38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353 (2005) (arguing that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause only applies to judgments and therefore has no effect on a state’s decision to recognize 
same-sex marriage). 
58See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook 
for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2166–94 (2005). It is noteworthy that Maryland, New Hampshire, 
and Wyoming each adopted bans on same-sex marriage before the 1993 Baehr case. Id. at 2165; MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (1987); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 
(1977).
59See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2004), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004). 
750 ILL.COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (1998). 
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and a woman.60The Supreme Court may ban these state mini-DOMAs either by finding a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage or by invalidating DOMA on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds. If the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate 
DOMA, this would make it extremely difficult for mini-DOMAs to stand as they 
discriminate in the same manner as the federal law. The Court could also rely on the 
Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism to invalidate DOMA, which would still 
permit state mini-DOMAs to persist. If the Court ultimately chooses to strike down 
DOMA, the rationale it chooses will have serious consequences forthe constitutionality of 
mini-DOMAs and the rights accessible to same-sex married couples, including the right 
to divorce.
B. Reasons to Strike down DOMA and recognize a national right to same-sex 
marriage
1. DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause
There are several arguments tied to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, which, if accepted, would lead the Court to find a federal ban on the recognition 
of same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The first argument is that such a ban constitutes 
sex discrimination and should be stricken under intermediate scrutiny.61 Although some 
refuse to view the prohibition of same-sex marriage as a matter of sex
discriminationbecause it applies equally to both men and women,62 individuals are being 
denied the right to marry solely because of their sex.63 That is, if Abby wants to marry 
Caroline, she is denied the right for the sole reason that she is a woman. Had Abby been 
born a man (or in some jurisdictions even transitioned into a man), the law would allow 
Abby to marry Caroline. In many respects, this argument echoes the notion that past 
miscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of race even though they applied equally 
to Caucasians and African Americans.64 If the Court chooses this path, DOMA will only 
stand if it is substantially related to an important government interest.65
Second, the Court may invalidate DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause as 
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation. Indeed, this was the 
                                                          
60Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NCSL, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx#2 (last visited May 
17, 2013). 
61See, e.g.,Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (J. Levison) (explaining that restricting marriage 
to a man and a woman violates the state constitution’s equal protection clause on the basis of sex-
discrimination because “on its face and as applied, [the statute] regulates access to the marital status and its 
concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' sex.”). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
199 (1976) (holding that gender discrimination warrants intermediate scrutiny). 
62See MACKINNON,supra note 20, at 1065–69. See alsoGoodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (does not mention 
gender discrimination in holding Massachusetts must recognize same-sex marriage).
63See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 218–28
(1999)(arguing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination).
64See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
65 The Government’s brief on the merits which argues DOMA fails intermediate scrutiny as “[n]one of 
Section 3’s actual purposes as expressed in the House Report, or any of the additional interests now 
asserted . . . substantially further[] an important governmental objective,” Brief for the United States on the 
Merits at 14, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307) and the lower court’s decision in Windsor v. 
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2012), discussed infra, may be used to support this claim. 
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argument the Second Circuit ultimately adopted in Windsor to hold DOMA 
unconstitutional.66 It was also the rationale used by the Supreme Court of Connecticut67
and the Supreme Court of Iowa,68 which both held laws restricting civil marriage to 
heterosexual couples violated their state constitutions’ equal protection clauses. 
Additionally, it is the argument set forth in the Government’s brief on the merits in the 
upcoming Supreme Court case.69 In Windsor, the Second Circuit foundthat DOMA 
discriminated on the basis of sexualorientation, and discrimination on the basis of 
sexualorientation required intermediate scrutiny.70 The court rejected the four 
justifications for DOMA: to (1) maintain a uniform definition of marriage; (2) protect the 
fiscal treasury; (3) preserve a traditional understanding of marriage; and, (4) encourage
responsible procreation.71 The court rejected the first rationale as being of unprecedented 
breadth and not “exceedingly persuasive” as the law itself “creates more discord and 
anomaly than uniformity.”72 The court quickly rejected the second rationale, explaining 
DOMA is “so broad . . . that it is not substantially related to fiscal matters.”73Recently, 
the Government has added the argument that even if DOMA “actually saves the 
government money (a dubious assertion), that rationale would not suffice under 
heightened scrutiny.”74The court denied the third rationale, as “DOMA does not, strictly 
speaking, preserve the institution of marriage as one between a man and a woman [as the 
decision to permit such marriages is left to the states].”75 Regarding the fourth argument, 
the court questioned whether a rational basis even existed regarding the connection 
between DOMA and encouraging responsible procreation.76
Currently, only a few courts, including one federal appellate court, have
recognized sexualorientation as requiring intermediate scrutiny for purposes of equal 
protection analysis,77 thereby placing a higher burden on the government. Although the 
Supreme Court has yet to apply heightened scrutiny to discrimination on the basis of 
                                                          
66Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181–88. 
67Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub.Health, 957 A.2d 407, 425–61 (Conn. 2008).
68Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885–904 (Iowa 2009).
69Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476–481; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896–906; Brief for the United States on the 
Merits, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307).
70See generally Windsor, 699 F.3d 169. 
71Id. at 185–88.
72Id. at 186.
73Id. at 187.But cf. Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding 
such a claim would pass rational basis review as “Congress could rationally have believed that DOMA 
would reduce costs.”).
74 Brief for the United States on the Merits, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307) at 15 (citing 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982)).
75Windsor, 699 F.3d at 187.
76See id. at 182–83
77See, e.g., id. at 185–88 (declaring that homosexuals should receive heightened scrutiny due to the fact (a) 
they have faced historical discrimination, (b) that homosexuality has no relation to homosexuals’ ability to 
contribute to society, (c) that homosexuals comprise a discernible group, and (d) that the class represents a 
politically weakened minority). But see Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (“[E]xtending intermediate scrutiny to sexual preference classifications is not a step open to 
us.”).
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sexualorientation,78 there is some possibility the Court will apply such scrutiny this 
spring.79Because the Court has never considered applying heightened scrutiny to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—it has previously employed a minimum 
rationality test to strike down laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation80—
applying heightened scrutiny would not require the Court to overturn precedent. 
Additionally, Attorney General Holder and President Obama have expressly requested 
that the Court apply intermediate scrutiny to strike down DOMA.81Specifically, the 
Government argues that classifications based on sexual-orientation warrant heightened 
scrutiny because: (1) there is a significant history of discrimination against gay and 
lesbian people;82 (2) sexual orientation bears no relation to one’s ability to participate in 
and contribute to society;83 (3) sexual orientation is an immutable or distinguishing 
characteristic;84 and, (4) gay and lesbian people comprise a minority group with limited 
political power.85
These arguments notwithstanding, Professors Michael Klarman and William 
Eskridge believe the Government’s brief will have little influence.86 The respondents 
argue heightened scrutiny should not apply since gays and lesbians are not politically 
powerless but “one of the most influential, best-connected, best-funded, and best-
organized interest groups in modern politics.”87 They also argue there is no longstanding 
history of discrimination,88 and sexual orientation is not an immutable trait.89 If the Court 
were to adopt intermediate scrutiny, it would have broad implications far beyond DOMA, 
and therefore, the Court may not be willing to do so. Even if the Court chooses to adopt 
rational basis review, the likelihood of which remains uncertain, there is a strong 
                                                          
78Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (employing rational basis to decide a case of discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (refusing to employ 
heightened scrutiny to perceived discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
79See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817–18 (2008) (arguing that Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 
requires sexual orientation discrimination receive intermediate scrutiny); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (hearing en banc denied, 680 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 
2012)). There is also an argument under the traditional Carolene Products analysis that LGBTQ 
community constitutes a class of “discrete and insular minorities” being denied access to the political 
system and therefore in need of heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4. See also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124HARV. L.
REV. 747, 761–62 (2011) (“[I]t is certainly possible that the Court may give formal heightened scrutiny to 
another classification or two in addition to the five that currently benefit from this form of judicial review. 
The fact that state courts have given legislation burdening gays strict or ‘quasi-suspect’ scrutiny under their 
state constitutions, for instance, may inspire federal courts to do the same.”).
80See generally Lawrence,539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
81Letter, supra note 31. 
82 Brief for the United States on the Merits at 22–27, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307).
83Id. at 27–29.
84Id. at 27–32.
85Id. at 14(“[T]he fact that gay and lesbian people have achieved some political gains does not tilt this 
factor against, let alone preclude, heightened scrutiny.”).
86See Miranda Leitsinger, Obama’s Supreme Court Brief on Same-sex Marriage Will Have Little Impact: 
Experts, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013, 10:46 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/28/17138448-
obamas-supreme-court-brief-on-same-sex-marriage-will-have-little-impact-experts?lite.
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argument that any ban on same-sex marriageis unconstitutional because such bans
constitute bare animus.
Under traditional rational basis review, courts are very lenient toward policies that 
may be discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite this lenient standard, 
there is an argument that refusing to allow same-sex couples the right to marry violates 
rational basis review as interpreted under its bare animus standard.90 The Supreme Court 
has emphasized“[i]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate interest.”91 Using this logic, the 
Court has struck down four laws which denied benefits to individuals on the sole basis 
the group was denied benefits because of the legislatures’ animosity toward those 
particular groups. 
In U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,the Court introduced the notion of bare 
animus by striking down a law that prevented unrelated individuals living together in a 
house from receiving food stamps.92 The Court reasoned that the legislature passed the 
law only to manifest its desire to harm a politically unpopular group, hippies, and that in 
order to survive rational basis, the law required more than a discriminatory purpose. The 
Court insisted a “purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and 
without reference to (some independent) considerations in the public interest, justify [the 
classification].”93 Moreover, the Court declared that despite the independent interests 
present, such as safeguarding the health and well-being of the population, as well as 
alleviating hunger and malnutrition by increasing food security for low-income 
households, those interests were insufficient to hold the law constitutional, as the 
mandated classification of excluding households with non-related individuals proved 
irrelevant to those stated interests.94
Nearly a decade after Moreno, the Supreme Court returned to the notion of 
impermissible animus in two cases. In Palmore v. Sidotti, the Court overturned a family 
court’s order to grant custody to a father so that the child would avoid bias by living with 
his mother who was in a biracial relationship.95 Again, the Court was unwilling to give 
effect to what it perceived to be nothing other than animus, in this instance, against 
biracial relationships.96 Then, in City of Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, the Court 
struck down a municipal zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for operating 
certain group homes, including “[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.”97 The case 
was brought by Cleburne Living Center, which wished to operate a group home for 
                                                          
90Cf. Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 682 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (although the Court 
does not use the term “bare animus,” it seems to employ a heightened form of rational basis to ultimately 
strike down DOMA). 
91 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis in original).
92Id. at 528.
93Id. at 534–35 (internal quotations omitted). 
94Id. at 533–35 (“[T]o be sustained, the challenged classification must rationally further some legitimate 
governmental interest other than . . . to prevent so-called [sic] ‘hippies' and ‘hippie communes' from 
participating in the [federal] food stamp program.”). 
95See Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
96Id.at 433 (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, 
give them effect.”).
97City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 436 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
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thirteen intellectually disabled individuals but was denied a special use permit at a public 
hearing.98 The Court reasoned the ordinance requiring the special use permits was 
unconstitutional because it was motivated solely by an “irrational prejudice” against the 
intellectually disabled.99 In both of these cases, the Court was stern in its judgmentthat 
prejudice against a politically unpopular group is insufficient to withstand a rational basis 
review of constitutionality.
Although the facts of Cleburne are not directly analogous to those in the same-sex 
marriage cases, thatdecision is particularly pertinent today as it could have direct 
consequences on the Court’s ruling on DOMA. In deciding Cleburne, the Court debated 
whether people with intellectual disabilities should receive heightened scrutiny as a 
class.100Ultimately, the Court reasoned they should not. Instead, the Court relied on the 
“irrational prejudice” of the ordinance to rule in favor of Cleburne Living Center.101
Similarly, if the Court takes an equal protection approach to decidingDOMA’s 
constitutionality, it could employ intermediate scrutiny102 but would more likely revert to 
employing rational basis review. 
Most similar to the situation at hand, Romer v. Evans103 examined a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of Colorado’s 1992 Amendment 2,which adopted a 
popular referendum that prohibited all legislative, executive, and judicial action designed 
to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation.104 The effect 
of the law was not only to prevent future action but also to repeal existing gay-friendly 
statutes, notably in Aspen and Boulder, which barred discrimination on the basis of 
sexualorientation.105 Without addressing whether sexualorientation should receive 
heightened scrutiny, the Court employed rational basis review to strike down Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 because it had no legitimate purpose but was “born of animosity” toward 
gays, with a goal “to make them [gays] unequal to everyone else.”106 The Court rejected 
the State’s argument that Amendment 2 simply placed lesbians and gays in the same 
position as others by removing a cause of action for discrimination on the basis of their 
sexualorientation but instead reasoned that the law “impose[d] a[n impermissible] special 
                                                          
98Id.at 435.
99Id.at 450.
100Id.at 442–447. The Court was required to address this argument as the Court of Appeals held in favor of 
the plaintiffs using intermediate scrutiny. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 
(5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e conclude that although mental retardates are not a suspect class, they do share 
enough of the characteristics of a suspect class to warrant heightened scrutiny.”).
101City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
102See generallyWindsor, 699 F.3d 169 (explaining DOMA discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation 
thus requiring intermediate scrutiny). 
103517 U.S. 620 (1996).
104 Amendment 2 read: 
Neither the State of Colorado . . . nor any of its agencies . . . shall enact, adopt or 
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to 
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
discrimination. . . . Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
105Id. at 623–24.See also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 911 
(2012) (explaining the legislative history of Amendment 2, whose record was full of anti-homosexual 
sentiments). 
106Id. at 621.
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disability upon those persons alone.”107The Court went on to analyze whether 
Amendment 2 withstood rational basis review and ultimately concluded the amendment 
was unconstitutional.108 This case demonstrates the Court will not permit legislation 
designed to target politically unpopular group. 
Despite the inherent similarities to Romer, it may be argued that the inability of 
same-sex couples to divorce is actually more similar to Moreno and Cleburne.  The laws 
in each case were motivated by animus and resulted in economic disadvantages to the 
unpopular groups. Specifically, hippies were unable to access the federal government’s 
welfare program because of their lifestyle choices, and the facility for the intellectually
disabled was unable to access a desired permit. Similarly, DOMA prevents same-sex 
couples from accessing,among a long list of benefits, the financial benefits of marriage. 
The concept of bare animus could be crucial in an equal protection analysis of 
DOMA or of same-sex marriage generally;without clear evidence of bare animus, 
plaintiffs almost always lose under traditional rational basis review.109 This is particularly 
important because the Court has never indicated it would be willing to adopt heightened 
scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Assuming the Court does 
use a rational basis standard, the animus rationale could be an easy route to hold DOMA 
unconstitutional without forcing the Court to determine whether discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation warrants heightened scrutiny.110 As Professor Laurence Tribe 
explained nearly a decade ago:
For what, after all, could be the rationale for permitting an otherwise 
eligible same-sex couple to enjoy the tangible benefits and assume the 
legal obligations of some version of civil union but withholding from them 
that final measure of respect . . . ? What could be the rationale for refusing 
two men or two women the full symbolic benefits of civil marriage so 
long as the state remains in the business of licensing within secular, civil 
law a status that no doubt piggybacks on its nonsecular counterparts in 
religious marriage? Plainly, the rationale must be the state’s disapproval of 
the same-sex couple's expression of dissatisfaction with a second-class 
version of the marital bond; the rationale must be to demand for opposite-
sex couples complete dominion over the last vestiges of gender privilege 
in civil law.111
                                                          
107Id. at 631.
108 Id. at 633 (The Court reasoned, Amendment 2 “is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons 
by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”).
109See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term 
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 370 (1999) (explaining that between 1971 and 1999, of the 
110 Supreme Court cases decided, employing rational basis review, only ten plaintiffs prevailed on their 
claims). See alsoMass. v. Dep’t of Health, 682 F.3d at 9 (“Equal protection claims tested by this rational 
basis standard, famously called by Justice Holmes the ‘last resort of constitutional argument,’ rarely 
succeed.”) (internal citations omitted). 
110Cf.Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (“The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the one 
hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the 
other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted 
in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to be) homosexual.”).
111Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1945–46 (2004). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
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The challenge in applying the bare animus rationale would be that if the Court took this 
approach, all states would be required to recognize same-sex marriage, a move for which 
the Court may not be ready.112If the Court holds DOMA to be unconstitutional under a 
rational basis review, it must find no rational basis for the law. Once the Court makes this 
finding, it would be nearly impossible for states to come up with a rational basis for 
upholding their mini-DOMAs. Because mini-DOMAs would remain discriminatory on 
the basis of sexual orientation without a rational basis to support that discrimination, 
mini-DOMAs would also be unconstitutional, and all states would not only be forced to 
recognize same-sex marriage within their borders but also be forced to perform such 
unions. A similar problem would develop if the Court used any of the equal protection 
analyses to hold DOMA unconstitutional. For if the Court were to hold that defining 
marriage as between one man and one woman for federal purposes constitutes 
impermissible discrimination, a state law that discriminated in the same manner would 
almost certainly also be considered impermissible discrimination. The Court may also 
fear the political consequences if it applies this analysis;if DOMA is analyzed and 
ultimately held unconstitutional under an equal protection analysis, it is possiblethat its 
supporters will be branded as “prejudiced bigots.”113Although there are several strong 
arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, the Court will likely avoid this analysis.
2. DOMA violates the Due Process Clause
The Court could also use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to find that there exists a fundamental right to marriage for same-sex couples and 
therefore find DOMA unconstitutional. Although none of the lower courts employed this 
tactic to hold a same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, a viable argument does exist.114
The due process argument begins with the Supreme Court’s declaration that “[m]arriage
is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival.”115 The Court has overturned restrictions against interracial marriage,116 onerous 
restrictions on marriages involving a prisoner,117 and a law that preventedindividuals who 
were delinquent on child support payments from marrying.118 Some scholars argue that a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
dissenting) (“[P]reserving the traditional institution of marriage is just a kinder way of describing the 
State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”) (internal quotations omitted).
112 Yoshino, supra note 28 (arguing that the Court will likely find a way to strike down DOMA without 
requiring the forty-one States that do not currently recognize same-sex marriage to do so). 
113 Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 99–100 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court avoided the equal protection route in Lawrence 
because doing so would have either turned sexual-orientation into a suspect classification, or because it 
would have had to find that the anti-sodomy law was created due to animus, thereby “branding supporters 
of anti-sodomy laws as prejudiced bigots”). 
114 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV L. REV. 747, 748 (2010) (“the Court has moved 
away from group-based equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
115Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
116Id. 
117Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
118Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY                                                           [2013
223
ban on same-sex marriage is similar to a ban on interracial marriage.119 Moreover, if 
marriage truly were one of the “basic civil rights of man,” it would seem odd that 
homosexuals cannot exercise that right. Although extending the fundamental right to 
heterosexual marriage to a fundamental right to marriage in generalwould require a small 
logical step by the Court, such a step is not inconceivable. If the Court is unwilling to 
recognize a fundamental right to same-sex marriage this spring, it seems likely that it or 
Congress will in the future.120
3. DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment
The Supreme Courthas acknowledged on several occasions that “[m]arriage has 
traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and, 
consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the 
Tenth Amendment.”121 Indeed, when the Constitution was written in 1787, the issue of 
marriage was never raised because it was understood that regulating marriage was an 
exercise of state police power.122 By then, the states had already set up detailed marriage 
laws and regulations as a means of establishing public order.123
Today, states have a significant amount of flexibility “in setting marriage 
requirements, including regulations related to age of consent, mental capacity, [and]
consanguinity.”124 The Tenth Amendment argument against DOMA is simply that the 
federal government does not have the authority to regulate marriage in this manner. Prior 
to the passage of DOMA in 1993, Congress had never before attempted to pass such 
sweeping regulations on marriage.125 Under traditional Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
a violation of the Tenth Amendment occurs only when the federal government is found to 
have commandeered state governments.126 Although the First Circuit found DOMA did 
not constitute a violation of the Tenth Amendment,127 a lower Massachusetts court found 
                                                          
119 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Live and Let Love: Self-Determination in Matters of Intimacy and Identity,101 
MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2200–07 (2003) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX,
MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003)) (finding many parallels between the opposition to same-sex 
intimacy and anti-miscegenation ideology). See alsoBaehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
120SeeKLARMAN,supra note 36, at 193–207; Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional 
Inevitability of Same-Sex Marriage,71 MD. L. REV. 471, 479–80 (2012).
121Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (declaring that the regulation of 
marriage is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”); Baehr, 
852 P.2d at 58 (“The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function reserved exclusively to the 
respective states.”); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (“The whole subject of the domestic 
relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United 
States.”). 
122See Affidavit of Nancy Cott, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 2010 WL 
604595, para 10 (D. Mass.). But see Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of 
Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 132 (2004) (explaining that 
Utah was required to ban polygamy before becoming a State).
123Cott, supra note 122, at para. 9. 
124Lauren Brown & Jena Shoaf, eds., Marriage and Divorce, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 493, 495 (2011). 
125Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12.
126SeePrintz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 
(1992).
127Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11.
Vol. 8:2] Ellen Shapiro
224
such a violation.128 Specifically, the lower court found DOMA violated the Tenth 
Amendment by regulating the states as states because it affects federal grants and costs, 
concerns attributes of state sovereignty, and is “of such a nature that compliance would 
impair a state’s ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions.”129Finding a Tenth Amendment violation would merely require the Court to 
find that Congress has overstepped its authority. If the Supreme Court wants to avoid a 
decisionon the constitutionality of same-sex marriage for the time being, this appears to 
be the best option.130 Even if DOMA is declared unconstitutional, by this rationale, mini-
DOMAs would remain constitutional. 
4. DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause
When DOMA was initially passed, many believed that it violated the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.  In particular, many felt that Section 2 of the Act, which allows states 
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, violates the 
Constitution’s requirement that each state must fully credit “the public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of every other state.”131The Full Faith and Credit Clause also permits 
Congress to enact general laws to “prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and 
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”132The Supreme Court has said that 
this clause transformed states from “independent foreign sovereignties, each free to 
ignore rights and obligations. . .of others” into “integral part[s] of a single nation, in 
which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application.”133 It 
has also been said that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “serves to coordinate the 
administration of justice among the several independent legal systems which exist in our 
Federation.”134 These reasons may explain why the Continental Congress included a 
similar clause in the Articles of Confederation.135 The Constitutional Convention left the 
clause mainly intact, but extended it to include public acts and records, as well as an 
effects clause.136
“During the Congressional debates surrounding DOMA, many worried whether 
the bill would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”137 For example, in 1996, Senator 
                                                          
128Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249–252 (D. Mass. 
2010) aff'd, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
129Id.
130But see Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Moment: Minimalism, Equality, and 
Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 210 
(2013) (“[I]f LGBT litigation strategies result in a more robust articulation of the Court’s federalism 
doctrine, negative consequences may follow in other contexts that LGBT advocates (and other 
progressives) consider important including seemingly far afield issues of regulatory and economic policy . . 
. .”).
131U.S. CONST. art.IV, § 1.
132Id.
133Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).




13728 U.S.C. §1738C (2006).But see Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(“DOMA is an example of Congress exercising its powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . . 
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Kennedy declared DOMA was “plainly unconstitutional,”138 articulating that although the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause gives Congress authority to prescribe the effect of one 
state’s laws in other states, “[it] does not give Congress the power to say that any such 
laws shall have no effect.”139 During this period, Laurence Tribe also argued that “[t]he 
Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot be read as a fount of authority for Congress to set 
asunder the states that this clause so solemnly brought together.”140Tribe explained that 
the enforcement clause permitting Congressional action does not permit Congress to 
create a categorical exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.141Tribe argued that 
such a reading “would convert the Constitution's most vital unifying clause into a license 
for balkanization and disunity.”142Despite its long history and visible connection to 
DOMA, neither the First Circuit nor the Second Circuit mentioned any connection with 
the Clause during their decisions involving DOMA.143Still, there is a legitimate argument 
that DOMA is unconstitutional under this rationale. Moreover, by holding DOMA 
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court would not be forced to 
strike down state mini-DOMAs.
However, it should be noted that a Full Faith and Credit Clause argument is not 
quite this simple. There exists a well-recognized public policy exception to traditional 
conflict of law problems whereby an individual state need not respect the acts, records, or 
judicial proceedings of another state if deemed contrary to that state’s public policy.144
Indeed, several of the mini-DOMAs include express language indicating that recognizing 
same-sex marriage is contrary to public policy.145For the Court to hold DOMA 
unconstitutional under the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it 
would need to invalidate those state public policy decisions. This is possible since the 
Court seems unwilling to recognize the moral disapproval of homosexuality as a 
legitimate public policy concern.146Still, there may be other rationales to justify the 
application of the exception. Whether the Court could recognize an assault to the tradition 
of marriage as a legitimate public policy concern is a more open question. On this issue, 
the First Circuit was explicit that defending traditional heterosexual marriage and 
traditional notions of morality failed constitutional scrutiny.147
                                                                                                                                                                            
Congress’ actions are an appropriate exercise of its power to regulate conflicts between the laws of two 
different States, in this case, conflicts over the validity of same-sex marriages.”).
138142 CONG. REC. S10102 (Sept. 10, 1996). 
139Id. 
140Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Less Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, at E11.
141Id. 
142Id. 
143See generallyWindsor, 699 F.3d 169; Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1. 
144See e.g., Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 
(1924); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 79-81 (1993). But seeLarry 
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 
YALE L.J. 1965, 1980–1992 (1997) (arguing that reading a public policy exception into the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause is unconstitutional). 
145See, e.g., Kan. Const. art. XV § 16.
146See Romer, 517 U.S. at 644–53.
147Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012).See also Dragovich v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 872 F. 
Supp. 2d 944, 955–57 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that protecting traditional notions of heterosexual 
marriage fail rational basis). 
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II. MINI-DOMAS PREVENT SAME-SEX COUPLES FROM ACCESSING COURTS
Although few advocates for same-sex marriage want to talk about divorce, with 
such a high divorce rate, same-sex marriage advocates should be thinking about divorce, 
especially if same-sex marriage continues to be acknowledged in some states and not 
others. The right to marry typically carries with it the right to divorce.However, only 
some states recognize same-sex marriage, and many states have residency requirements 
for divorce. Therefore in at least some states, same-sex couples have the right to marry 
without the corollary right to divorce. If the Court invalidates DOMA but permits states 
to choose whether or not to perform or even recognize same-sex unions, many same-sex 
couples will continue to find themselves without access to divorce. Whether same-sex 
wedlock will remain a problem depends for the most part on how the Court rules in 
Windsor.148
Meanwhile, it is important to understand the trauma faced by same-sex couples 
unable to access state courts for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. To understand the 
extent of the problem of marital wedlock, it is important to understandwhy people get 
divorced and how divorce affects an individual in the future. Although many believe 
divorce is a modern phenomenon, the first American divorce took place in 1637.149
Today, divorce is common in America, and almost 5,000 divorces are granted every 
day.150 Despite the emotional and economic trauma often associated with divorces, 
married couples are able to end their marriages with relative ease.151
People divorce for a variety of reasons. In the late nineteenth century, it was said 
that: 
Many causes [for divorce]may arise, physical, moral, and intellectual, 
such as the contracting by one of the parties of an incurable disease like 
leprosy, or confirmed insanity, or hopeless idiocy, or a conviction of a 
felony, which would render the continuance of the marriage relation 
intolerable to the other party. . . .152
Today, individuals continue to divorce for countless reasons. Among others, individuals 
may choose to end marriage because their spouseswereunfaithful, the marriage has grown 
stale or unsatisfying, or the marriage is damaging in some way.153It has been said that 
“[t]he primary effect to be accomplished by a divorce or dissolution is the separation of 
the parties in a manner that enables each to continue his or her life as free[ly] as possible. 
                                                          
148 As explained above, if the Court holds DOMA unconstitutional under an equal protection framework, it 
seems likely that mini-DOMAs will be held unconstitutional. See supra PartII(b)(1). If DOMA is held 
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states would at least be required to recognize same-
sex marriages performed out-of-state. See supra Part II(b)(4). Finally, if the Court holds DOMA 
unconstitutional under a Tenth Amendment framework, mini-DOMAs would likely stand. See supra Part 
II(b)(3).
149GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE:AN AMERICAN TRADITION 2 (1991). 
150 Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex) Divorce, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 447, 448 (2011). 
151Id. at 448–449, 455.
152Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
153See e.g.,Mary Penrose, Unbreakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the Fundamental Right to Divorce
[forthcoming VILLANOVA L. REV. 2013] 49.
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. . .”154 Moreover, divorce itself “provides a framework within which divorcing couples 
can themselves determine their post-dissolution rights and responsibilities.”155 Divorce 
not only provides couples with an orderly means by which they can divide their assets 
and separate their financial relationship but also grants individuals an emotional ritual of 
separation.156 Without the possibility of divorce, couples are bound to each other both
emotionally and legally.157 Although the potential negative consequences of divorce 
should not be overlooked (for instance, it is common for one spouse to be left at a 
significant economic disadvantage),158 for many the benefits outweigh the disadvantages.
Professor Judith Stinson,who has written on the evolution of American divorce 
law, claims that restricting individuals’ ability to divorce is “morally problematic for a 
number of reasons”159:
First, when a government forces a person to remain married to an 
individual who is no longer of his or her choosing, that person's personal 
autonomy is significantly reduced. Second, the perspective that marriage 
is, at least in some sense, a contract rather than simply a status suggests 
that divorce cannot be prohibited. Third, married persons are often legally 
liable for their spouse's actions, even absent consent, and courts should not 
shackle a person with unwanted and unintended liability. Finally, 
individuals cannot remarry if they remain legally married to another 
person.160
These factors appear consistent with the notion that the primary effect of divorce is to 
enable freedom and flexibility.161 Still, Stinson does not seem to direct enough attention 
to the non-economic entanglement that occurs when married couples are unable to 
divorce. Not only will separated same-sex couples married and unable to divorce deal 
with legal liability for their spouses’ actions, but they will also continue to be legally tied 
to their spouses’lives. Returning to Port and Cowan’s marriage,162 when Port was worried 
she would be unable to divorce Cowan, one of her concerns would be the consequences 
of Port having children.163 Given the rise of reproductive technology, it is increasingly 
common for lesbians to have biological children.164 Specifically, Port was concerned that 
                                                          
154Ward v. Ward, 41 Or. App. 447, 451 (1979).
155Robert H. Mnookin& Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
156Gay Divorce Still Legal in California, N.Y.TIMES, May 27, 2009, available at 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/gay-divorce-still-legal-in-california/.
157Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (“[T]wo consenting [heterosexual] adults may divorce 
and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage . . . .”).
158MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 653 (“Men tend to maintain the standard of living they had before the 
divorce, while women and children sink into instant poverty.”).
159 Stinson, supra note 150, at 465.
160Id.
161See Jackson supra note 134 (and accompanying text). 
162See supra notes 1–11 (and accompanying text).
163See Landau, supra note 9.
164KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 51. 
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if she remained legally married to Cowan, Cowan would be presumed to have joint-
custody of Port’s future child, even if she and Cowan no longer interacted.165
While Cowan and Port’s separation appeared fairly amicable, without access to a 
divorce, there is no way to ensure an equitable division of assets.166 Additionally, without 
a formal divorce, spouses may not receive alimony or child support even when they 
would be entitled to such.167Another issue which may arise if a couple is unable to 
divorce is the presumed authority for end-of-life decision making, by which an estranged 
spouse could have the final say on whether to grant or withhold life-saving treatment.168
As a result of the many difficulties that arise, at least a few scholars believe that divorce 
is a fundamental right and that an individual without access to divorce knows neither 
liberty nor justice.169
Nevertheless, it seems likely that this problem will persist for at least a limited 
time, as the nation in its entirety does not seem ready to embrace same-sex marriage. 
Although “[same-sex marriage] is closer to ordinary than ever before in America,”170 the 
nation remains split on the issue. Only forty-eight percent of Americans say they favor 
same-sex marriage, while forty-three percent are opposed.171A review of specific states 
showsa majority of Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas oppose same-
sex marriage while only thirty-five percent support its legality.172
If the Court were to strike down DOMA while allowing mini-DOMAs to stand, 
those states with such legislation and many others could continue to ban same-sex 
marriage through their own legislatures. Indeed, it is possible that if the Court takes a 
stance moving in the direction of the nationalization of same-sex marriage, the nation will 
see a period of backlash, and individuals in some states may become more hostile to the 
LGBTQ community. If the Court allows mini-DOMAs to remain, it should realize the 
consequences this will have on same-sex marriage and divorce. While the legal system 
typically dictates “when a divorce may occur, how a divorce must be procured, and what 
the consequences of divorce will be,”173 in regards to same-sex divorce, the legal system 
seems to have gone astray. In 1888, the Supreme Court declared, “it is not perceived that 
any principle should prevent the legislature itself from interfering, and putting an end to 
the relation [marriage] in the interest of the parties as well as of society.”174 In 1971, the 
                                                          
165Id.
166See, e.g.,MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 208 § 34 (2012).
167See, e.g.,MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 208 §§28, 53 (2012).
168See, e.g.,N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2994-d.
169 Penrose, supra note 153, at 46, 48; Stinson, supra note 150, at 473. Although the Court has not 
expressly declared divorce is a fundamental right, Boddie supports this notion. See generallyBoddie, 401
U.S. 371.
170 Michael A. Lindenberger, America’s Coming-Out Election: How Gay Issues Became Mainstream. 
TIME. November 12, 2012.Available at http://nation.time.com/2012/11/12/americas-coming-out-election-
how-gay-issues-became-mainstream/.
171PEW RESEARCH CENTER. Behind Gay Marriage Momentum, Regional Gaps Persist. (November 9, 2012), 
http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/09/behind-gay-marriage-momentum-regional-gaps-
persist/[hereinafter, PEW RESEARCH].But see KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 161 (“Six opinion polls 
conducted within a year showed national support for gay marriage ranging from 51 percent to 53 
percent.”).
172PEW RESEARCH, supra note 171.
173Mnookin&Kornhausert,supra note 155, at 951 (emphasis in original).
174Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888).
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Court explained due processrequired parties seeking divorce to have a “meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.”175And yet today, many married same-sex couples find
themselves trapped in their marriages. 
As long as states fail to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, it is 
likely that couples will find themselves unable to divorce.176If some states acknowledge 
same-sex marriage while others do not, individuals who are married in a state which 
recognizes same-sex marriage and then move to a state which neither performs nor 
recognizes same-sex marriages for any purpose, mayfind themselves unable to receive a 
divorce in their new home state. Moreover, due to state laws that requireresidency for 
access to state courts for the purpose of divorce, these couples may also be unable to get 
divorced in the state in which they originally married.177For instance, Massachusetts’ 
residency requirement is so strict as to deny court access to those couples who have 
“removed into this commonwealth for the purposes of obtaining a divorce.”178 Denying 
same-sex couples the right to divorce is a violation of their due process rights and a 
serious assault on their personal liberty. 
The due process issue of divorce mirrors one addressed by the Supreme Court in 
Boddie v. Connecticut.179 There, the Court considered whether a state may limit access to 
its divorce courts by charging fees that effectively bar the poor from dissolving an 
existing marital bond or from forming another.180The Supreme Court held that, given the 
fundamental nature of the marriage relationship and the state’s monopolization of the 
means of dissolving that relationship, where a state failed to waive unaffordable divorce 
filing fees, the state deprived poor couples of liberty without due process of 
law.181Because most states do not recognize same-sex marriage and the Court has 
expressly held residency requirements are constitutional,182 the question of same-sex 
divorce is slightly more complicated. Still, if a partial ban on divorce in the form of 
preventing those who could not afford to pay from obtaining a divorce is 
unconstitutional, how is one to defend a complete ban on divorce for same-sex couples?
It took Jessica Port and Virginia Cowan three years to divorce after numerous 
expensive, time-consuming, and emotionally draining appeals. Other couples
encountered even more challenges. When Francesca and Donna-Marie Cerutti-O’Brien 
decided they were ready to end their marriage, the courts were uncooperative.183 The 
couple married in Massachusetts in November 2006 and moved to Florida shortly 
                                                          
175Boddie,401 U.S. at 377, 379–80 (Although this opportunity may be denied on account of a 
“countervailing state interest of overriding significance,” it “must be protected against denial by particular 
laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals.”).
176 It is possible that States banning same-sex marriage could recognize same-sex marriage for the limited 
purpose of granting a divorce. See infra Part III. 
177See e.g.,MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (2012) (“A divorce shall not, except as provided in the 
following section, be adjudged if the parties have never lived together as husband and wife in this 
commonwealth; nor for a cause which occurred in another jurisdiction, unless before such cause occurred 
the parties had lived together as husband and wife in this commonwealth, and one of them lived in this 
commonwealth at the time when the cause occurred.”).
178MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 208 §5 (2012).
179Boddie,401 U.S. at 376.
180Id. 
181Id.
182Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S.Ct. 553 (1975) (holding that a one year residency requirement was constitutional). 
183Cerutti-O'Brien v. Cerutti-O'Brien, 928 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
Vol. 8:2] Ellen Shapiro
230
thereafter.184 Problems in the relationship arose swiftly, and the couple filed for divorce 
in Massachusetts on June 27, 2007.185 After the probate and family court dismissed their 
complaint for divorce due toa lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Francesca, determined 
to secure a divorce, appealed.186 The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate and family 
court’s decision, explaining that although the couple had married in Massachusetts, 
because the plaintiff was not continuously domiciled in Massachusetts following the 
wedding, the couple did not satisfy the residency requirements of Massachusetts divorce 
law, and the case was dismissed.187Because Francesca moved to Florida to be with her 
wife following the wedding, the couple was ineligible for divorce in Massachusettsand 
elsewhere.188 That same-sex couples are finding themselves trapped in their marriages 
with no escape is unacceptable. 
III. STATES WITH SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS SHOULD RECOGNIZE SUCH MARRIAGES 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS.
As this article has demonstrated, one of the many complicated unforeseen issues 
surrounding same-sex marriage is the inability of same-sex married couples to divorce. 
Although some scholars cannot imagine marriage without its corollary, divorce,189 few 
gay-rights activists fought for same-sex marriage with divorce in mind. Instead, they 
argue that same-sex couples “needed the law to adapt to the reality of their changing 
families” through same-sex marriage or at least the rights associated with 
marriage.190Because the inability to divorce is a serious issue for those couples who find 
themselves trapped in a marriage they are ready to put behind them, today’s same-sex 
couples not only require the right to enter into marriages, but they also need the law to 
permit thedissolution of such marriages. If the Supreme Court permits states to retain 
their mini-DOMAs, the question will remain whether these laws alone are sufficient to 
keep married couples from divorcing. While the Court should consider the possibility that 
mini-DOMAs will continue to prevent same-sex couples from divorcing, congressional 
measures could also relieve the inherent tension of permitting same-sex divorces in a 
mini-DOMA state. 
Under the current State-by-State framework, it is often difficult for same-sex 
couples to divorce due to (1) domicile requirements to access state courts for the purpose 
of divorce, and (2) state statutory or constitutional provisions in the form of mini-
DOMAs which prevent courts from recognizing (and therefore abolishing) same-sex 
marriages. Relying on mini-DOMAs, state courts can quickly reject claims for same-sex 
divorces for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For example, in J.B. & H.B.,the Texas 
Court of Appeals ruled that a lower court did not have the authority to entertain a petition 
for same-sex divorce because the state constitution and statutes defined marriage as 
between a man and a woman.191 Because the state was constitutionally and statutorily 




187Id. at 1004–09. 
188See id. at 103.
189See generally Penrose, supra note 153. 
190KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 51 (emphasis added). 
191In re Marriage of J.B.&H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex. App. 2010).
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prohibited from recognizing same-sex marriages entered out-of-state, the court claimed 
that it did not have the authority to recognize the marriage for purposes of 
divorce.192Although the couple had been separated for two years,193 they were left 
without a means of ending their marriage. This particular court went so far as to say, “[a]
Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a same-sex marriage than it 
does to administer the estate of a living person.”194Similarly, prior to its legislated 
recognition of same-sex marriage,195 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Chambers v. 
Ormistad found that a Rhode Island family court could not properly recognize a same-sex 
marriage for the purpose of entertaining a divorce.196 The Chambers court’s analysis was 
quite simple: [a]lthough family courts may “hear and determine all petitions for divorce 
from the bond of marriage,” the court found “absolutely no reason to believe that. . .the 
legislators understood the word marriage to refer to any state other than ‘the state of 
being united to a person of the opposite sex.’”197
Despite these cases, there remains some question as to whether mini-DOMAs are 
sufficient to keep married couples from divorcing. Mary Patricia Byrn and Morgan 
Holcomb argue that mini-DOMAs do not prevent state courts from granting relief to 
same-sex couples seeking divorce.198Byrn and Holocomb contend that judicial findings 
of a lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce are justified by misguided 
readings of mini-DOMAs and state court jurisdiction.199Specifically, Byrn and Holocomb 
argue that because state courts have broad jurisdiction to hear any justiciable dispute, 
absent express legislative intent to prohibit state courts from hearing same-sex divorces, 
state courts should hear the cases rather than engage in judicial activism to strip 
jurisdiction.200Accordingly, ByrnandHolocomb would likely applaud the Wyoming 
Supreme Court’s Christiansen decision for finding subject-matter jurisdiction over same-
sex divorce despite Wyoming’s mini-DOMA.201
In Christiansen, Paula Christiansen and Victoria Lee Christiansen, residents of 
Wyoming, were married in Canada in 2008.202 In February 2010, the couple filed for 
divorce in Wyoming, a state that did not recognize same-sex marriage.203The district 
court dismissed the divorce petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on the 
State’s mini-DOMA. 
                                                          
192Id. at 663.
193Id. at 659.
194Id. at 666 (quotations omitted).
195Same-Sex Marriage Bill Becomes Law, RHODE ISLAND STATE HOUSE (May 2, 2013), available 
athttp://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/News/pr1.asp?prid=9245. 
196Chambers v. Ormistad, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007).
197Id. at 962.
198Byrn& Holcomb, supra note 21, at 6.
199Id. at 9 (“No state has placed same-sex divorce in a specialized tribunal. As such, state trial courts are 
presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce petitions. . . . Georgia is the only state 
in which its state DoMA strips the trial courts of jurisdiction over same-sex divorce because Georgia's is 
the only state DoMA that mentions divorce.”). See alsoGA. CONST. art. 1 § 4 para.1(b).
200Byrn& Holcomb, supra note 21, at 9.
201See id. at 27. See also Christiansen v. Christiansen,253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo. 2011).
202Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 153. 
203Id. See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20–1–101.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court, while finding inherent tension between the mini-
DOMA defining marriage as “a civil contract between a male and a female,”204 and 
another Wyoming statute adopted much earlier that provided “[a]ll marriage contracts 
which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are valid in this state,”205
found no such conflict in regards to same-sex divorce proceedings.206In an attempt to 
harmonize the statutes which appeared facially in conflict, the Court recognized same-sex 
marriage for the limited purpose of divorce.207 The Court explained that while the mini-
DOMA prevents same-sex couples from entering into a marriage in Wyoming, it does not 
mention same-sex marriages entered elsewhere208; moreover, the other statute expressly 
allows for Wyoming to recognize a valid Canadian same-sex marriage.209It is important 
to realize that although few States have such a parallel statutory structure expressly 
requiring courts to reconcile them, the Wyoming statute mandating recognition of out-of-
state marriages is for the most part a codification of the dominant common law principle 
lex loci celebrationisthat requires a State to recognize an out-of-state marriage as long as 
the marriage does not offend state public policy.210 Viewed in this light, most states 
should be able to use Christiansen as a model.211 It is important for other states to 
understand the Court’s declaration recognizing same-sex marriage for the limited 
purposes of divorce proceedings does not threaten a state’s general ban on such 
marriages:
[R]ecognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose 
of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in 
Wyoming against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages. A divorce 
proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing 
relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists plays no role 
except as a condition precedent to granting a divorce. . . . Respecting the 
law of Canada, as allowed by § 20-1-111, for the limited purpose of 
accepting the existence of a condition precedent to granting a divorce, is 
not tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage.212
New York, prior to its legalization of same-sex marriage in June 2011, may also be used 
as a model for how states that do not generally recognize same-sex marriage can do so for 
the limited purpose of granting a divorce. Even though New York did not yet recognize 
same-sex marriage, its courts were willing to recognize same-sex marriage for the limited 
purpose of granting same-sex divorces. For example, in C.M v. C.C.,the State Supreme 
                                                          
204WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20–1–101.
205WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-111.
206Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156.
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210See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13 (2010); Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit, 90 N. C. 
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Court held the New York court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a same-sex couple 
married in Massachusetts.213 Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, this court distinguished 
the recognition of marriages from the performance of marriages, reasoning that “the 
recognition of a same sex marriage solemnized abroad was not contrary to the public 
policy of this state even if the marriage could not be solemnized in New York.”214
However, this court took a more expansive approach than the Wyoming court by 
declaring that recognition of same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, not just for 
purposes of divorce, isa general question of comity. Unlike the Wyoming Court, Judge 
Rosalyn H. Richter wrote, “it is well-settled that in deciding whether to recognize a 
marriage that occurred in a sister state, the critical question is whether the marriage 
would be valid where contracted.”215Because the same-sex couple was validly married in 
Massachusetts in 2005, Judge Richter concluded that the common law doctrine of comity 
required the New York court to grant jurisdiction for divorce.216 It should be noted that 
although this decision was enabled in part because the Court drew upon a lower court 
decision which already established same-sex marriages performed out-of-state should be 
recognized,217 notions of comity could still be used by other states to reach the same 
conclusion. Although the general notion of comity is one rationale to justify same-sex 
marriage, states that do not permit same-sex marriages would likely follow the rationale 
of the Wyoming court as its holding is more limited. Still, this case should be used as an 
example of how states that do not permit same-sex marriage may still allow for same-sex 
divorce.
Using a similar rationale as the New York State Supreme Court, in Hammond v. 
Hammond,a New Jersey court was willing to recognize a Canadian same-sex marriage 
for the limited purposes of divorce in spite of the state Attorney General’s arguments to 
the contrary.218The opinion sympathized with the couple’s situation in which a dying 
woman wished to break legal ties to her spouse with whom she was no longer in a 
relationship and against whom she had previously obtained a domestic violence 
restraining order so that she could marry her current partner, thereby transferring rights, 
including end-of-life decision making from her removed spouse to her current partner.219
Ultimately, the court invoked lex loci celebrationis, by which marriages validly 
contracted in other jurisdictions are valid in New Jersey as long as they are not offensive 
to New Jersey’s public policy.220Interestingly, the New Jersey court relied on the same 
case as the C.M v. C.Ccourt to affirm that comity should be employed.221 Judge Mary 
Jacobson reasoned, “I don’t see how granting a divorce here is inconsistent with the 
legislature’s intent because the legislature did not address the specific issue.”222 This 
court believed “we would have a very different situation” if New Jersey had enacted a 
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mini-DOMA.223However, as evident inChristiansen, the presence of a mini-DOMA does 
not necessitate a ban on same-sex divorce. 
Wyoming, New York, and New Jersey should be used as models for how to 
handle same-sex divorce.Even if the Court makes same-sex marriage a state-by-state 
issue, all fifty states should still hear cases regarding same-sex divorce. While in 
Texas,Judge Tena Callahan (whose decision was ultimately overruled) permitted same-
sex divorce by declaring that Texas’ ban on same-sex marriages and civil unions violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause224—thereby permitting two men
which had married in Massachusetts to divorce—a complete upheaval on same-sex 
marriage bans is not required for a court to hear a same-sex divorce. The couple in 
questionhad a simple request for a non-contentious divorce that became a national story 
and an attempt to overhaul the state’s mini-DOMA.225 Given that only thirty-five percent 
of Texas supports the legalization of same-sex marriage,226 it is hardly surprising that any 
attempt to overturn Texas’ mini-DOMA227 would be met with significant resistance.228
As long as states are permitted to ban same-sex marriage, an issue that will likely 
be decided this spring in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the difficulties with same-sex divorces 
will remain. As demonstrated above, courts in Wyoming, New York, New Jersey, and 
Marylandovercame the inherent tension in forbidding the performance of same-sex 
marriage while allowing same-sex divorce by separating the issues and by confining the 
recognition of same-sex marriage to the specific purpose of ending the marriage. If courts 
acknowledge, as the Wyoming Supreme Court did, that recognizing same-sex marriage 
for the “limited purpose of accepting the existence of a condition precedent to granting a 
divorce, is not tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage,”229 the 
difficulties of same-sex divorce will be reduced. 
The recognition of same-sex marriage for the limited purposes of divorce should 
be required even in states thatassert specific public policy reasons banning same-sex 
marriage or have passed explicit bans on recognizing same-sex marriages. Although it 
has been settled that “[t]he State. . .has [the] absolute right to prescribe the conditions 
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the 
causes for which it may be dissolved,”230 it remains unclear whether states may prescribe 
limitations on divorce other than jurisdictional requirements. To require states to 
recognize same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of divorce would resolve a serious 
due process problem faced by same-sex couples unable to seek a divorce without 
interfering with the state’s policies against such marriages. Recognizing a marriage for 
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purposes of its termination is surely distinct from performing the marriage. Moreover, 
considering that it is possiblestates will be forced to recognize same-sex marriage for 
purposes of determining federal benefits, it would seem incongruent not to recognize 
same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce. While marriages are meant to last forever, 
they often fail, and the couples wish to part ways. Married same-sex couples deserve this 
opportunity just as much as married heterosexual couples. By demanding states recognize 
same-sex marriage for the limited purposes of divorce, many couples will be saved from 
unwanted wedlock. 
